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The present volume is a discussion of a well-worn topic in 
which the authors find a number of fresh issues and employ an 
approach absent from earlier treatments of geometrical analysis. 
The Collectio of Pappus of Alexandria contains the longest 
ancient description of geometrical analysis [Ed. Hultsch, 634- 
6361, and chs. 2-8, which form the core of the present work, 
examine the Pappian theory and practice in detail, from a 
number of directions, First (ch. 2) is a clear discussion of 
Pappus' description, together with a Greek text and English 
translation. An attempt is made to solve the famous "directional" 
problem of analysis by a novel interpretation of one of the key 
words in Pappus' description. The problem, as stated on p. 11, 
is "Does analysis consist in drawing logical conclusions from 
the desired theorem [the "downwar'd" view], or in looking for the 
premisses from which such conclusions (ultimately leading to 
the theorem) can be drawn [the "upward" view]?" The reason this 
has been a problem is that there are elements in Pappus' 
account that appear to favor each of these views. The proposed 
solution is to interpret &oXouOe;Tv and &K$kOUeOV, the words 
which give support to the "downward" view (634.12; 636.2,9), 
not along the lines of "logical consequence," but more vaguely 
as "what goes together with," and then to take this in the 
present context to refer to the premisses from which the desired 
conclusion can be deduced. The consistency produced by this 
Gordian Knot approach is much to be desired, and the authors 
marshal enough evidence for the interpretation to make it likely 
that their account will win some currency. 
The examination of Pappus' use of geometrical analysis in 
chs. 3-7 also produces some noteworthy conclusions. First, 
Pappus' description of analysis does not fit the method as it 
was actually employed. Contrary to Pappus' account, analysis is 
in practice a "downward" movement beginning from the desired 
conclusion (designated by B) and also the material taken as 
"given" in the enunciation of the theorem or problem (A) (toge- 
ther with axioms and previously established results (K), and 
proceeding deductively to a conclusion (E) which can be inferred 
from A and K alone, without the help of B. A complete treatment 
of a theorem or problem by means of analysis involves four steps, 
not simply the two (analysis and synthesis) normally recognized. 
It must first be shown that the conjunction of A, B, and K implies 
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E; then that the conjunction of A and K implies E (this step is 
called, for better or worse, the resolution); third, one must 
begin afresh from A and K and make whatever auxiliary construc- 
tions are needed to prove B (this is the KaTaaKcufi found in the 
normal divisions of a geometrical proof), and finally, one 
must prove B. There is nothing to correspond to the “upward” 
direction of reasoning (i.e. from conclusion to premisses) 
which is so prominent in Pappus’ general description of analysis. 
The present work also challenges the normal “propositional” 
interpretation of analysis, i.e. as a method of discovering a 
proof for a proposition, so that “what is being analysed is the 
deductive leap from axioms to the theorem being proved, which 
is analysed into a sequence of steps of deduction” (p. 31). It 
offers instead an account of analysis as “analysis of figures”: 
what is analyzed is the set of relationships among the configura- 
tion of geometrical objects specified in the enunciation of the 
problem or theorem. This interpretation emerges from the 
examination of Pappus’ practice, particularly in the light of 
the stress placed on a neglected feature of geometrical proce- 
dure, the ‘6~13~:ars or “instantiation,” in which we move from the 
general enunciation of a theorem or problem (e.g. “in any 
triangle.. . ‘I) to what looks like a particular instance of the 
configuration described there (“let ABC be a triangle...“). The 
authors point out a number of important results of the use of 
&OECIIS and of KaTaotccu4 in geometry, such as their heuristic 
value and the fact that the Karaolccufi has the effect of intro- 
ducing additional individuals into the proof, and therefore, 
as a comparison with first-order logic shows, of guaranteeing 
the non-triviality of geometrical analysis and of geometry in 
general (p. xiii, 3-5, 44 ff.). Now this is an interesting 
and in many ways illuminating way to view analysis, but the 
authors fail to establish that it is the only proper way to do 
so. Their approach in ch. 4 is to criticize previous attempts 
to characterize the “propositional” interpretation, but what is 
wanted is a sympathetic treatment of the “propositional” inter- 
pretation in the light of the new information. This is 
especially true for the point made on p. 39, that “the analysis 
of deductive steps . ..is usually thought of as linear,” whereas 
in an analysis of figures it “is not linear, but takes the form 
of more complicated network of connections,” and “these several 
lines of thought can be pressed into the form of a linear argu- 
ment, but only by somewhat unnatural means.” Instead of grounds 
for rejecting any “propositional” approach, this criticism 
should perhaps be read as an invitation to adopt a more flexible 
“propositional” view. Given the undoubtedly propositional 
nature of theorems and the arguably propositional nature of 
problems (where “to construct.. .‘I is taken as “to prove that.. . 
exists”) it may be more instructive to see analysis as exploring 
the relations among propositions via relations among instantiated 
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figures. 
A prominent position is given to the “resolution” (the 
second stage in an analytical treatment of a theorem or problem) 
in ch. 6. This is the longest chapter in the book and the most 
illuminating. It gives a complete account of the function of 
the “xesolution” and its relation to the other parts of an 
analytic proof, and draws together many strands in the discussion 
of analysis. 
Ch. 7 considers how well Pappus 1 terminology in his general 
description of analysis agrees with what has been uncovered about 
his practice. One main conclusion of the chapter which seems 
sound is that regarding the “direction” of analysis. But much 
of the rest of the chapter is weak. A good deal of the chapter 
is devoted to showing that portions of Pappus’ terminology indi- 
cate that he adhered to the “instantial” view of proofs, 
according to which “the several steps of a proof were considered, 
not so much as steps between propositions, but rather as steps 
between geometrical objects with certain properties” (p, 72). 
But the evidence cited is weak (and little is from Pappus) and 
the reasoning frequently tenuous. In any case, since the con- 
clusion will be that in some respects Pappus’ description of 
analysis matches his practice very badly, it is difficult to 
see what is to be gained from the labor to force certain other 
elements of his account to accord with his use of the method. 
Ch. 8 attempts to locate Pappus within the tradition of 
Greek geometrical analysis, and contains valiant but likewise 
questionable attempts to find parallels between Pappus’ ter- 
minology and the language of other accounts of analysis from 
Aristotle (p. 85 ff.) [l] to Philoponus (p, 88 f.) [2] to Heron 
of Alexandria, especially in an-Nairizi’s Arabic translation 
(p. 92 ff.) [3]. 
In treating descriptions of analysis which are acknow- 
ledged to be different from Pappus’ (especially Proclus’), the 
authors touch on an area which is worth considering at greater 
length and which would have been profitably treated in the 
present work. The existence of distinct kinds of geometrical 
analysis and philosophical analysis (p. 90 f.) suggests that a 
book with the present title should have provided a detailed 
account of the other kinds as well. 
In ch. 9 the authors skip a millenium and discuss the 
influence of analysis on Galileo, Newton, and Descartes, in 
order to establish forcefully the importance of analysis in the 
scientific revolution of the seventeenth-century. This is 
clearly a subject deserving close and careful treatment in the 
style of chs. 2-8, not the short shrift it receives. There are 
apparent weaknesses in the chapter which fuller discussion 
might have alleviated. Most noticeable is the large number of 
unsupported or weakly supported assertions on Descartes (p. 114). 
But also, there is insufficient evidence given for the major 
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claim that Newton conscious ly modeled his method of analysis on 
Greek geometrical analysis. Better grounds for this view can be 
found in recently published manuscript material of Newton 
[I. B. Cohen, Introduction to Newton's Principia. Cambridge, 
Mass. (Harvard Univ. Press). 1971, 294-5, 3471. In any case, 
there is much to recommend the suggestion that it is to Greek 
mathematical analysis as presented in the present work that 
algebraic analysis and Newton’s “analytical” experimental method 
are indebted, for their approach as well as their names. 
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The book is marred by a sizeable number of errors in 
grammar and spelling and also by occasional faulty references. 
A source of slight annoyance is the inconsistency in treating 
Greek words. Sometimes they are transliterated, sometimes not, 
and occasionally the same word is found both ways in the same 
paragraph. 
The book, though not without defects, is a worthy contri- 
bution to the literature on ancient mathematical methods and to 
the problem of analysis in particular. It opens up a number of 
areas without attempting to be definitive on all of them. In 
a number of places it would have benefited by giving a more 
detailed and sympathetic treatment of rival views and possible 
alternative interpretations. Its principal virtue is in its 
determination to understand the methods of ancient mathematics 
by examining them as they were used, not only as they were 
described by ancient mathematicians and commentators. The 
results of this part of the investigation are hard-won and 
the fertility of this approach should be obvious to all readers. 
NOTES 
1. Eth.Nic. III.3 lllZblS-29. The forced effort to see 
similarities can be seen by referring to the passages cited for 
rEAos and &pxii. 
2. Where, however, the discussion is rather too brief and 
inadequately argued. In particular, the reasons and evidence 
given for the main claim, the Philoponus viewed analysis as 
analysis of figures, not propositions, seem weak: why couldn’t 
the thing being analyzed be the proposition that this triangle 
is isosceles? Instead of saying that he moves from one geome- 
trical object to another establishing interdependencies between 
them, why not say that he proceeds from one proposition concerning 
these objects to another? And it is a howler to suggest that 
Philoponus must agree with a statement Aristotle makes in the 
Metaphysics simply because he borrows a theorem Aristotle uses 
as an example in the Physics (and also frequently elsewhere). 
3. But here the evidence is so remote and so slight that 
any conclusions seem unfounded. Moreover the evidence given for 
Heron’s use of &pxfi does not support the authors’ conclusion. 
